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The Eighth James D. Hopkins
Lecture

Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?
Barbara Black*
Most disputes between customers and their brokerage
firms or their salespersons are resolved through arbitration
before the National Association of Securities Dealers Dispute
Resolution, Inc. (NASD)' or the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), 2 as a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Shear3
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon. The McMahon Court
held that predispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) contained
4
in customer agreements are enforceable. It concluded that the
current arbitration process provided adequate means of enforc* James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Lecture at Pace University School of
Law (Feb. 12, 2004).
1. NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. is a subsidiary of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. (hereinafter NASD) that administers its dispute resolution services. Since the NASD operates the largest dispute resolution forum in the
securities industry, I focus on its procedures.
2. Both the NYSE and the NASD are Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)
as defined in Section 3(a)(26) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(26) (1994).
3. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
4. Id. at 338.
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ing federal statutory rights, and by this reasoning a PDAA was
the equivalent of a choice of forum clause. 5 McMahon was part
of two larger trends of the Supreme Court: the Court's general
pro-arbitration trend, 6 and its efforts to remove private securities fraud claims from federal court. 7 While the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of securities arbitration, many investor advocates
viewed McMahon as anti-investor,8 a view that continues to
have support today.
This is an assessment of the current securities arbitration
process from the perspective of an investor advocate. In my
view, investors may fare better in arbitration than in litigation.9
Accordingly, the trend to transform securities arbitration into a
more judicial process may not be advantageous to investors.
There are additional reasons to be concerned about the securities arbitration structure created in response to McMahon in
light of the proliferation of securities arbitration claims and the
demands they place on the current system. Finally, I conclude
by addressing the special concerns of the small claims investors.

5. See id. at 229-30.
6. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (stating that
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) "declared a national policy favoring arbitration");
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-35 (1991) (holding that
employment discrimination and statutory age discrimination claims were arbitrable); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-91 (2003) (holding
that unsupported assertions that arbitration costs were prohibitive were insufficient to make PDAA in consumer financing agreement unenforceable).
7. See Barbara Black, The Irony of SecuritiesArbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage Firms Need JudicialProtection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 415 (2003). I develop many of the ideas sketched out here further in this article. See generally id.
at 444-53.
8. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role
of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 C ADozo L. REv. 991, 993 (2002).
9. Arbitration of employment and consumer disputes, in my view, presents
greater policy concerns than arbitration of investors' disputes. Given the universality of PDAAs in customer agreements, retail investors realistically have no
choice but to agree to arbitration if they wish to purchase securities; they can,
however, pursue alternative investment opportunities. In contrast, most people
have to work, and many people have to finance life's necessaries; the law should be
especially vigilant that these individuals' legal remedies are not curtailed.
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Fairness

How can we determine whether securities arbitration is
fair to investors? In recent years, customers have been awarded
damages in slightly more than fifty percent of the arbitration
cases that are decided by arbitrators. 10 This statistic, unfortunately, tells us nothing, since we do not know the merits of any
claims, we do not know what amount the "winning" claimants
were requesting, and we do not know the outcomes of the many
claims that are settled." An informative analysis might be a
comparison of the results in securities arbitration with those obtained in either litigation or other arbitration forums. Unfortunately, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded in
be2000 that it had no basis to make any such comparisons
12
forums.
alternative
in
small
too
were
cause caseloads
There is some empirical support that claimants' attorneys
find the Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) arbitration process
sufficiently fair not to seek out other arbitrationforums. When
13
the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) recently initiated a two-year pilot program offering non-SRO alternatives, there were few participants, and the program was
discontinued.' 4 In addition, a NASD-sponsored survey of participants in its arbitration forum over a two-year period found
the process fair. 15 There is consensus, however, that an inde10. NASD Dispute Resolution Statistics, Results of Customer Arbitration
Claims, at http://www.nasd.com/stellent/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&node
Id=516&ssSourceNodeId=12 (last updated Sept. 27, 2004).
11. NASD Dispute Resolution Statistics, How Arbitration Cases Close, at
http://www.nasd.com/stellent/idcplgIdcService=SS-GETPAGE&nodeId=516&ss
SourceNodeId=12 (last updated Oct. 27, 2004).
12. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GGD-00-115, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: ACTIONS NEEDED To ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS 4-5 (2000),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00115.pdf.

13. SICA consists of representatives of the SROs, the public and the Securities Industry Association and develops proposals for uniform securities arbitration
procedures. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 488-90 (1996).
14. See SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE FINAL REPORT - PILOT PROGRAM FOR NONSRO-SPONSORED ARBITRATION ALTERNATIVES (undated) (on file with author).

15. See Gary Tidwell et al., Party Evaluation of Arbitrators:An Analysis of
Data Collected from NASD Regulation Arbitrations (Aug. 5, 1999), available at
http://www.nasd.com/stellent/groups/med-arb/documents/mediation-arbitration/
nasdw_009528.pdf.
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pendent study of investors' perceptions of the securities arbitra16
tion process is warranted.
Absent empirical data, we must explore whether there exists an abstract model of a fair process for resolving disputes
between customers and their brokers. In fact, there are two
competing models. The first is the traditional model of arbitration where the parties contract for an equitable, informal, and
confidential proceeding. 17 The second model, in contrast, assumes that arbitration must at least approximate, if not replicate, litigation. The McMahon Court may have assumed the
second model when it equated PDAAs with forum selection
clauses 18
Adherents of the first model attribute its benefits to its dissimilarity from litigation. This model has a venerable history
dating back to the origins of the NYSE, where members met
informally to resolve their disputes. Prior to McMahon, this
was the operative model at the SROs, where the arbitration
procedures were informal and largely aspirational, emphasizing
cooperation among the parties. 19
This model is very attractive if its original premise - that
arbitration is the product of a genuine bargain - is accepted.
Reality, however, compels the recognition that the PDAA in the
customer agreement, like arbitration clauses in consumer and
employee agreements more generally, is contained in a standard-form contract where the average retail customer has no
choice, since all brokerage firms today include PDAAs in their
customer agreements. The SEC, SICA and the SROs recognized that McMahon required revision of the securities arbitration process. The SEC pushed for a litigation model, while
SICA and the SROs resisted this transformation of the arbitra16. See Michael A. Perino, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REGARDING ARBITRATOR CONFLICT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN NASD AND

NYSE SECURITIES ARBITRATIONS 33-37 (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://
www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf.
17. For an expression of this view, see Robert S. Clemente & Karen Kuper-

smith, Pillarsof Civilization: Attorneys and Arbitration, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. &
TAX F. 77, 79-80 (1999). Mr. Clemente and Ms. Kupersmith are the former and
current Directors of Arbitration at the NYSE, respectively.
18. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

19. See Black & Gross, supra note 8, at 997.
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5

tion process. 20 In many ways, the SEC won that debate; since
McMahon, securities arbitration procedures have become more
formal, leading a well-respected panel appointed by the NASD
to review its procedures to express concern in 1996 that "the
has graduincreasingly litigious nature of securities arbitration
21
arbitration."
SRO
of
ally eroded the advantages
This ongoing debate over the competing models, with
thoughtful, well-reasoned positions on both sides, complicates
the task of assessing whether investors are treated fairly in the
securities arbitration process.
In my view, securities arbitration is a fairer process than
many consumer/employee arbitration processes that, because of
the Supreme Court's view of preemption, 22 states cannot adequately regulate. 23 Since the SEC has oversight over the SROs
and must approve every SRO rule, it has, even before McMahon, looked out for investors in revisions to the SRO arbitration
rules. 24 I use the components identified by scholars as necessary for procedural fairness in consumer arbitration 25 in this
evaluation of the NASD arbitration process.
The NASD procedures are fair with respect to the following
components: reasonable notice that the customer is entering a
PDAA, 26 right to representation of counsel, 27 right to present ev20. For more detailed discussion of the post-McMahon revisions and the positions of the SEC and the SROs, see Black & Gross, supra note 8, at 999-1005.
21. NAT'L AsS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM REPORT OF
THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE 7 (1996).
22. Since the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to arbitration agreements
in interstate commerce, states cannot adopt laws that conflict with the FAA's purpose of putting arbitration agreements on an equal footing with all contracts. See
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (holding that the FAA
preempted a state law requiring arbitration agreements to have disclosure
provisions).
23. For a textbook example of an unfair employment arbitration process, see
Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause where the process lacked "the rudiments of evenhandedness").
24. See Black & Gross, supra note 8, at 998-1003.
25. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury
Trial, Separationof Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 85-98
(1997).
26. See NAT'L AS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, CONDUCT RULES R. 3110(f) Books and
Records (Requirements When Using PredisputeArbitrationAgreements with Customers) (2003), available at http://www.cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasdviewer.asp?
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idence, 28 right to present one's case in a convenient geographic
forum, 29 and right to adequate relief.30 I do not intend to discuss these further, but they are all important components of
fairness not always found in other consumer/employee
arbitrations.
More problematic are the following components:
1. The cost of arbitration. Is it fair to require employees and
consumers, including investors, to pay forum fees? Courts
generally have low filing fees and waive the fees for those
unable to pay them; in contrast, securities arbitration forum fees are based on the amount of claimed damages and
the number of hearing sessions and can be significant. 31
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that excessive arbitration fees may unfairly deny consumers access to the forum. 32 In addition, some circuit and state courts have held
that in employment disputes where the charge is illegal
statutory discrimination, the employer must pay the forum
fees. 33 To date, however, courts have not been sympathetic
to this argument in the context of securities arbitrations, at
least where the investor had a sizable investment portfolio. 34 Moreover, both the NYSE and the NASD have proceSelectedNode=3&FileName=/nasd/nasdrules/RulesoftheAssociationmg.xml#ch
p- 1 - 3 .
27. See NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, R.
10316 (2003), available at httpJ/www.nasd.com/stellent/idcplgIdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeId=537 [hereinafter NASD CODE 2003].
28. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 27, R. 10323.
29. See NASD Notice to Members 95-16, Predispute Arbitration Clauses in
Customer Agreements, 1995 WL 1712330 (National/Federal) (Mar. 1995).
30. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (holding that arbitrators have the power to award punitive damages). The securities
industry has consistently fought against punitive damages awards, most recently
by arguing that the due process limits of BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559 (1996) and State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) are
applicable in arbitration. For a judicial acceptance of this view, see Sawtelle v.
Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
31. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 27, R. 10332.
32. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 531 U.S. 79.
33. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir.
1997); McManus v. CIBC World Mkts. Corp., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 457-58 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003).
34. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Coe, 313 F. Supp. 2d
603 (S.D. W. Va. 2004); Ritch v. Eaton, No. CIV.A.02-7689, 2002 WL 32107628
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2002).
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dures for fee waivers, 35 and arbitrators can allocate the
costs among parties as they deem appropriate. 36
Unbiased decision maker. Most arbitration panels consist
of three members, one of whom is an industry representative.3 7 Participants select the panel members from computer-generated lists,38 a recent innovation and an
improvement over the past practice where the NASD selected the panelists. There remain, however, three issues
about the arbitrator selection process:
A. The presence of an industry arbitrator. Consumer advocates, looking to the judicial model of an independent
decision-maker, question the fairness of a tribunal
where one panelist is a member of the securities industry. One of the benefits associated with the arbitration
model, however, is decision making by those knowledgeable in the field, and the industry arbitrator provides that expertise. The SEC has not questioned the
presence of an industry arbitrator, and at least one independent arbitration forum saw value in industry expertise. 39 Experienced investors' attorneys are divided
on this issue.
B. The "Repeat Player" problem. The dangers of the "repeat player" in arbitration are well recognized; the defendants who regularly use the forum will select
arbitrators who decide in their favor, and arbitrators
who want to be selected for more arbitrations will curry
favor with the repeat players by deciding cases
favorable to them. SRO securities arbitration may differ from many other arbitration forums, however, in
that the arbitrators' compensation is well below market
rate for comparable services. 40 While it is plausible to

35. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 27, R. 10332(a).
36. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 27, R. 10332(c).
37. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 27, R. 10308(b)(1)(B).
38. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 27, R. 10308.
39. Before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) effectively ceased operating as a securities arbitration forum, it also classified arbitrators as neutral or
industry parties. Effective July 1, 1999, the AAA suspended its securities arbitration rules. See Am.ARBITRATION AsS'N, Supplementary Procedures for Securities
Arbitration, available at http://www.adr.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
40. NASD arbitrators are paid $200 for each hearing session (consisting of no
more than four hours); a business day typically consists of two hearing sessions.
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believe that the brokerage firms strike arbitrators they
deem too investor-friendly, it is also plausible to believe
that at least those claimants who are represented by
experienced counsel strike arbitrators who consistently
decide in favor of the industry. As a result, panels frequently consist of arbitrators whom neither party
selected.
C. Are public arbitrators truly neutral? There is concern
that some arbitrators who are classified as public have
present or past connections with the securities industry
that call into question their impartiality. The NASD
has responded with these concerns by recently tighten41
ing the requirements for being a public arbitrator.
In sum, while the NASD procedures have improved considerably, parties can reasonably disagree about the extent to which
arbitrators are impartial.
3. Right to Adequate Discovery. Under the NASD procedures,
investors have the right to adequate discovery. 42 In actuality, investors may have difficulty obtaining the relevant
documents because of blatant disregard of the discovery
rules by brokerage firms. Discovery abuses and, more generally, disregard of the forum's procedures may be more
prevalent in arbitration than in litigation, because of the
differences between arbitrators and judges. Arbitrators,
with their occasional service for minimal compensation,
may not have either the backbone or the incentive to ensure
compliance with the forum's rules in the face of a recalcitrant brokerage firm. Similarly, firms may not have either
the respect or the fear of arbitrators that they have toward
judges. The practice is so widespread that the NASD recently has taken steps to publicize the problem and reinforce the power of arbitrators to impose substantial
The chair of the panel receives a $75 honorarium per day. See NASD CODE 2003,
supra note 27, IM-10104 (Arbitrators' Honorarium).
41. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 27, R. 10308, 10312 (effective July 19,
2004).
42. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Order Granting Approval to Proposed
Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Creating a Discovery Guide for Use in NASD Arbitrations, 64 Fed. Reg. 49256 (Sec. Rel. No. 3441833) (Sept. 10, 1999).
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sanctions for abuses. 43 It remains to be seen whether these
actions will cure the problem.
4. Right to Know Something of the Arbitrator's Rationale.
Some knowledgeable observers of the securities arbitration
process are critical of the fact that most awards do not provide reasons for the panel's decision. While it is frustrating
to lose a significant decision without explanation, realistically a losing party benefits from an explanation only if it
provides him with a basis for appeal on the merits.
I recognize that there may be other less tangible and more
general benefits if arbitrators are required to give reasons. Requiring arbitrators to give even a brief explanation of their reason can provide a curb against irrational results. Wellintentioned, but time-pressured arbitrators may be too quick to
arrive at a decision that initially seems right to them; requiring
them to give reasons will provide discipline to help ensure that
their decision is well-founded. 44 Another benefit is that parties
who are selecting arbitrators will have a basis for better selection if they know more than simply the outcome of previous
claims decided by the arbitrator. Finally, and more generally,
since arbitrators are playing an important role in a securities
arbitration process where it is important that all participants
have confidence in the system, there should be more transparency in the decision making process. 45
The above arguments do have considerable force. Their
benefits must be balanced against two related practical difficulties. The first is that the arbitrators do not get paid for writing
opinions; their honorarium is based on the number of hearing
sessions. While the compensation structure could be revised, it
is unlikely that arbitrators would be sufficiently compensated
43. See NASD Notice to Members 03-70, Discovery, NASD Reminds Members
of Their Duty to Cooperate in Arbitration Discovery Process (Nov. 2003), available
at http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/0370ntm.pdf; NASD, Discovery Sanctions Rule;
Accelerated Effectiveness Requested, File No. SR-NASD-2004-088 (June 8, 2004),
available at http://www/nasdadr.com/pdf-text/rfD4_88.pdf.
44. This argument is similar to the argument that corporate procedure can
improve the quality of decisions made by a board of directors. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
45. Another benefit sometimes mentioned is that reasoned awards provide an
opportunity for arbitrators to set forth their views on industry practices. This
raises a larger issue: whether awards should become the equivalent of judicial
opinions.
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for the time necessary to craft a reasoned award. The second
difficulty, as lawyers know, is that it is more difficult and takes
more time to write succinctly and unambiguously. A brief explanation, that to the arbitration panel and perhaps to the parties themselves is clear, may seem ambiguous and confusing
from the distance of a reviewing court.
5. Right to Judicial Review. There are very limited grounds
for judicial review of arbitration awards, which is consistent
with the premise of arbitration that the parties agreed to a
binding and final nonjudicial dispute resolution process.
Under the FAA, the bases for vacating an award relate to
arbitrator misconduct; there is no basis for review of the
merits. 46 The Supreme Court has several times referred,
without elaboration, to a non-statutory "manifest disregard
of the law" standard.4 7 To vacate an award because of
"manifest disregard," as articulated by the Second Circuit,48
the party must show, first, that the applicable law is "well
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable"4 9 and, second, that
the arbitrator "appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no at-

tention to

it."50

Under this test, the manifest disregard

standard is less a review of the merits than another form of
arbitrator misconduct - situations where the arbitrators
"willfully flouted" the law. 51
There is, in fact, a great debate over whether arbitrators
have to apply the law. In the traditional model of arbitration,
arbitrators were expected to do equity and a compromise might
be the best result. Under New York law, for example, unless
the parties agree otherwise, arbitrators are not bound by the
46. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (2003).
47. The Court first referred to the standard in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
436-37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989), and relied on it in McMahon as providing some assurance
that investors' statutory rights would be upheld. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233. Another Supreme Court opinion, First Options of Chicago, Inc v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 942 (1995) also refers to the manifest disregard standard as applicable to securities arbitration awards, again without explanation.
48. Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 218 (2d Cir. 2002).
49. Id. at 209 (quoting Merrill Lynch v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir.

1986)).
50. Id. (quoting Merrill Lynch, 808 F.2d at 933).
51. Id. at 217 (quoting Merrill Lynch, 808 F.2d at 933).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss1/1
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law. 52 In contrast, the McMahon Court assumed that courts
would apply the law, 53 an assumption, however, that is difficult
to disprove.
If arbitrators do not give reasons for their awards, it is hard
to establish manifest disregard, since a court has to posit that
there is no scenario under which the outcome is possible. If,
however, the practice develops of arbitrators writing reasoned
awards, then it seems likely that courts may begin examining
those reasons and conducting a review on the merits. A recent
case provides an excellent example of this problem. In Hardy v.
Walsh Manning Securities, LLC, the arbitration panel found
both the firm and the CEO "jointly and severally liable . . .
based on the principles of respondeat superior." 54 The district
court confirmed the award even though, under black letter law,
an employee cannot be held liable on respondeat superior principles, because it found substantial evidence in the record of the
CEO's personal involvement in the wrongdoing.5 5 The Second
Circuit, however, vacated the award as to the CEO and directed
a remand to the arbitration panel for clarification of the
grounds for imposing liability on the individual, emphasizing
be imposed upon
that "substantial financial liability should not
56
law."
in
basis
an individual without a clear
While the perception is that judges rarely vacate awards on
manifest disregard grounds, my own research leads me to conclude that courts are vacating awards on this basis more frequently, often at the instance of the brokerage firm or
individual broker to set aside large customers' awards. 57 Adherents of the judicial model of arbitration may welcome increased judicial review of the merits, but if this trend marks the
first step toward viewing arbitration forums like minor league
52. Silverman v. Cooper, 61 N.Y.2d 299, 308 (1984) (citing Lentine v.
Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382 (1972)).
53. 482 U.S. 220.

54. 341 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2003).
55. Id. at 129.
56. Id. at 134. On remand, the arbitration panel clarified that it found the
CEO primarily liable and intended to impose respondeat superior liability only on
the firm. Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., Arbitrators' Response (Nov. 10, 2003)
(copy on file with author).
57. See, e.g., Wallace v. Buttar, 239 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). This
case, and others, are discussed in Black, supra note 7, at nn. 140-48 and accompanying text.
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courts, that would be a serious erosion of the initial premise of
arbitration.
From the investors' perspective, the great advantage of the
SRO equitable model of arbitration is that arbitrators may be
able to find a remedy for investors that is not supported by the
law. Federal securities law, in particular, is not investorfriendly; the Second Circuit, for example, held that a widow
with a tenth grade education and no prior investment experience should have read and understood the prospectus for a limited partnership interest recommended by her broker. 58 In
addition, brokerage firms will assert that exculpatory language
in the customers' agreements reduces their liability. For these
reasons, investors are frequently better off in an equitable
forum.

59

Is It Time for Professional Arbitrators?
All the aspects of fairness discussed above relate to the central conundrum of securities arbitration today: Can a quasi-judicial process work effectively without "quasi-judges," decisionmakers who would be more like judges than the current NASD
arbitrators? Arbitrators are not required to have legal training
or to know the applicable law, and, unlike judges, they do not
have law clerks to research the law. As they are assigned individual cases and work on a piecemeal basis, they have neither
the resources nor much incentive to devote time to caseload
management. Perhaps as a consequence, NASD has a problem
of backlogged cases and in an effort to reduce the caseload has
promoted securities mediation as a more efficient alternative to
arbitration. 60 Concern has been expressed about whether the
NASD will be able to handle the increase in case filings expected to follow from the scandals involving conflicts of interest
among securities analysts.
58. Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 1993).
59. For further development of this argument, see Black & Gross, supra note
8, at 1035-40.
60. NASD promotes mediation as a party-driven process, reminiscent of the
traditional view of arbitration. See NASD, What is Mediationand How Does Mediation Differ from Arbitration?, at httpJ/www.nasdadr.com/med-alt path.asp (last
visited Oct. 21, 2004).
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The securities arbitration system serves a very important
role in our capital markets system. Investor confidence in the
system is integral to its continued success; investors must have
confidence that disputes with their brokers are resolved fairly.
The increased SEC oversight over the process since 1987 attests
to its importance. The foundation of a fair arbitration system
must be the arbitrators themselves. Increasingly, the NASD
expects more from its essentially volunteer, nonprofessional
corps of arbitrators. I fear that the NASD is building an elaborate structure on a shaky foundation; despite all their good intentions, many arbitrators may not be up to the increased
responsibilities the NASD expects from them.
Is it time to seriously consider institution of a staff of fulltime professional arbitrators? Unfortunately, the related area
of commodities futures provides an unpromising parallel. Instead of arbitration, customers can elect for a reparations process before administrative law judges at the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission. A few years ago, the Wall Street
law judges
Journal reported that one of the two administrative
61
customer.
a
of
favor
had never ruled in
Small Claims
I want to conclude with a few words about the special
problems of investors with small claims, who frequently cannot
obtain legal representation. The process is too complicated for
pro se investors, and the simplified arbitration process for
claims not exceeding $25,000, where one arbitrator decides a
dispute on submitted papers without a hearing, 62 is an unsatisfactory alternative, principally for two reasons. First, many pro
se investors may not be capable of composing a document that
both sets forth in an orderly fashion the relevant sequence of
events and makes a persuasive argument for imposing liability
on the broker. Second, most disputes between customers and
brokers involve issues of credibility, and the arbitrator has no
opportunity to assess the credibility of the parties. Under the
current system, the arbitrator can call a hearing to resolve
61. See Michael Schroeder, If You've Got a Beef with a Futures Broker, This
Judge Isn't for You, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2000, at Al.
62. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 27, R. 10302.
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these issues, but arbitrators understandably may be reluctant
to do so, since it defeats the purpose of a simplified arbitration,
and the prospect of presenting his case at a hearing is not likely
to be viewed as a positive development by a pro se claimant.
Consideration should be given to creating a "small claims"
arbitration forum, where a trained, professional arbitrator
would hold one hearing session where he would allow the customer and the brokerage firm to tell their side of the story and
present their evidence. While the customer may, if he chooses,
be represented by an attorney, the firm cannot be represented
by counsel, but would send a representative. While either the
NASD or the SEC could establish the "small claims" forum, the
SEC's involvement may provide small investors with more assurance that the forum is neutral and the process is fair. It
would also allow the SEC to become more educated about the
problems of small investors.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss1/1
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